A final reply argues that these principles of divergence are themselves excluded from their conciliatory rules. Well understood, these principles require reconciliation in the event of ordinary disagreement, but require firm action in the event of disagreement over disagreement. From this point of view, true principles are therefore not self-destructive. Several philosophers have advocated such a reaction to self-destruction. Bogardus (2009) argues that we can “simply see” that the conciliatory principles are true, which prevents them from undermining themselves. Elga (2010) argues that conciliatory views, well understood, are freed, because fundamental principles must be dogmatic about their own correctness. Pittard (2015) argues that it is no more respectful to remain determined in the thought of reconciliation than to be conciliatory with dementia. The argument here is that reconciliation on one`s own conciliatory principles would be respectful of faith or one`s own credibility, but firm with regard to argumentation. So, as soon as we appreciate the different levels of faith/credibility and thinking, any reaction to a disagreement about the importance of the disagreement requires being firm on the same level. This, Pittard argues, poses no problem on the farm vis-à-vis the thought of reconciliation. Equal Weight View was also motivated by analogies. Analogies with thermometers are particularly important.
Thermometers record information as inputs and give certain temperature values as outputs. Humans are a kind of cognitive machine that takes different types of information as inputs and gives doxastic attitudes as outputs. In this way, humans and thermometers are analog. Support for equal weight view came from the investigation of what it would be rational to believe in a case of disagreement by the peers-thermometers. Suppose you and I know that we have reliable thermometers in the same way, and while we study the temperature of the room we are in, we find that our thermometers give different outputs (yours is “75” and mine is “72”). What is rational for us to believe in room temperature? It would seem irrational to me to continue to believe that it was 72, just because it was the emission of the thermometer I was holding. Similarly, it seems irrational to me to think that your thermometer is not working simply because my thermometer has delivered another output. It would seem that I would need some information regardless of this “disagreement” to discount your thermometer.
So it seems to me that I have been given a reason to believe that the ambient temperature is not 72 by having learned from your thermometer that this reason is as strong as my reason for believing that it is 72, and that this reason is only defeated by independent considerations. . . .